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Abstract
In 2003, the French Guided Public Transport Safety Decree updated the current transport legislation. It gave safety missions to the 
Service Technique des Remontées Mécaniques et des Transports Guidés (henceforth STRMTG), mainly in assessing and 
controlling the safety level of those systems. Since then, this national safety authority has collected national data on safety for each 
type of systems. And each system requires a particular follow-up, related to its specificities.
The aim of the present paper is to concentrate mainly on underground systems, taking into account their specificities such as 
tunnels, automatic pilots, platform doors, etc. From those, a classification for the safety indicators was nationally established to 
identify the information needed by the STRMTG and the related means used to obtain it.
The information needed by the STRMTG concerns different types of events with a classification distinguishing those, which have
to be immediately reported to the national authority of safety from those, that have to be followed simply by statistics. For all of 
them, different elements are required to understand the circumstances of the events and their aftermath. Moreover, as there are only 
very few collective events, the STRMTG decided to ensure a follow-up of other indicators, which don’t generate any real incidents 
but could have, in other conditions : these are precursors of incidents, that also reflect the safety level of the networks.
With all this information, the STRMTG constitutes a yearly report, presenting the statistics with those safety indicators and their 
evolution over a few years. This statistical analysis doesn't aim at comparing networks nor at presenting a safety level classification. 
The aim of this is first, to have a national and anonymous view on underground events and second, to know which type of 
configuration is related to the biggest number of events and which aggravating factors are involved. It also gives the possibility to 
the STRMTG to make analyses on specific issues, to find common events between networks, and to analyse the evolution of these 
indicators in order to reinforce its attention on those points.
This study is only made possible thanks to a number of operators, who regularly transmit all the necessary data to ensure this 
follow-up. Such follow-up is conducted by different means: annual reports or a national common data-base. On a daily basis, a 
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significant amount of work was carried out with those local actors and still goes on to improve the reliability of the follow-up
process.
After a presentation of the methodology referred to above, we will present the results of this safety indicators’ follow-up over the 
period from 2012 to 2014, based on the data from and on underground networks.
© 2016The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V..
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1. Introduction
Metro networks (underground railways) in France represent 32 lines, including 2 of the regional express network 
(RER), within 6 large cities. Several new lines are also in project.
As a national safety authority, The Technical Department of the Ski lifts and the public Guided Transport ĀService 
Technique des Remontées Mécaniques et des Transports Guidésā (STRMTG), which reports to the Ministry of 
Transport, ensures the mission of safety control of its systems. This mission contains various involvements on each 
of the metro networks, including safety audits, follow-up of the operation and events which impact on safety. The 
safety events, based on strict selected criteria, are subject to an individual follow-up by the STRMTG on the basis of 
a report transmitted by the operator.
In order to have an annual follow-up of these events on the scale of the whole metro networks, relevant safety 
indicators were set up at national level. Independently of the individual follow-up of these events, the aim of safety 
indicators is to follow in a multi-annual way the evolutions of the accidents and the trends according to an adapted 
and invariant classification. This led to the implementation of data collection methods and tools, agreed with all the 
rail operators. All of these data are then subject to an analysis led by the STRMTG, which compiles all the analyses 
in a report and publishes them every year. This STRMTG.ÿs report is, of course, sent to the metro operators; 
moreover, it is public and available online, on its website.
2. Data collection methodology
In 2012, in correlation with a database " metro/RER events ", the guide " Processing events relating to metro / RER 
safety " was drawn up to provide the classification of the operatorsÿ events and the other indicators relating to the 
safety of metro networks, followed by the STRMTG (repeated events, critical events). This guide is also available on-
line on its website.
2.1. Safety events & indicators
The classification described in this guide shows three event categories and indicators followed-up by the STRMTG, 
according to the particular attention and seriousness of the event (classified in descending order).
First category events:
The first category events, which are listed below, must be seized in an individual way in the database Āmetro/RER 
eventsā, according to their gravity and their occurrence. The number of probable victims and the seriousness of 
events must be transmitted; these events are followed-up by the STRMTG.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
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                                       Table 1. First category events.
1. Smoke emission in a train or in a tunnel
2. Derailments
3. Collision
4. Collision with obstacles 
5. System affected by the external environment 
6. Single person accident, including : falling from the tracks to the platform, falling into 
trains, falling between a train and a platform, collision by a moving train, 
electrocution, electrical hazard
7. Various, including : evacuation in inter-stops / inter-train stations that went wrong,  
railway rolling stock defect, fixe installations defect, any other kind of incident related 
to the safety
The guide specifies the description of every type of event as well as the criteria of the causes and consequences 
combined, which allows identifying, at best, the classification of the concerned events, as showed in the example 
below, illustrating the event "Smoke emissions in a train or in a tunnel".
Table 2. Excerpt from the Guide "Processing events relating to metro networks / RER safety", for the description of the event “Smoke emission 
in a train or a tunnel”.
N° Events Description Cause criteria 
Consequence 
criteria 
Examples
1
Smoke emission in
a train or a tunnel
1.1 Smoke emissions -
- Intervention of emergency 
and rescue services 
- limited impact 
Ignition cables, wastes on 
fire on the track, emission 
of smoke coming from the 
rolling-stock...
1.2
Fire, with large amount 
of smoke 
-
- Extinguishment by the 
rescue services and at 
least one of the below 
criteria :
- substantial damage 
to the installations or to 
the rolling-stock ;
- smoke-filled 
underground galleries 
and/or stations/ train 
stations enforcing  an 
evacuation ;
- operational disruption 
of one hour or more
Ignition or fire with a 
large amount of fumes 
invading  one or many 
stations / train (e.g. : 
tires)
Second category events:
The second category events, listed below, are of lesser importance. They must be transferred to the state 
departments, as annual statistics, through the operating report which is yearly established by the operator. The number 
of potential victims (only slightly affected a priori) involved in the events, must also be provided.
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                                       Table 3. Second category events.
1. Minor smoke emissions
2. Inter-station / inter- train station evacuations
3. Metro-travelers falling in the train
4. Collision/ entrapment in train doors or in platform doors 
5. Other kind of falls outside of trains 
6. Irruption
Monitoring indicators of the third category events:
Finally, considering the low number of events affecting the safety of these systems observed on metro networks,
indicator monitoring systems were set up. They must as well be transferred through the operatorÿs annual report.
                                       Table 4. Indicators of the third category events.
1. Passing at a closed signal
2. Excessive speed
3. Obstruction on the tracks
4. Switch back to manual driving
As stated in the guide, some of these indicators are specific to some systems. For example, excessive speed must 
only be indicated for specific metro networks, for instance, when nominal mode is manual driving.
2.2. Tools for the data transmission of “events and indicators”
All the required data for the follow-up of the events and the indicators of safety are transmitted to the STRMTG 
through two tools: the database "metros / RER events" and the “operators” annual reports, already mentioned above.
The database "Metros/RER events" was created just like the database "Tramway events", pre-existing, with 
adaptations integrating specificities appropriate to metro systems. This database introduces references to the guide 
mentioned previously. It is supplied by all the operators during the year N+1 allowing them to compile their own 
features. The database contains at least an overview of the first category events.
Each event of the first category is associated to a memo containing clarifications on: the date, the hour, the place,
network characteristics, the circumstances, the facts, the measures taken after the overcome of the events…
Improvements were already brought to the database in the aftermath of operators’ feedback. These improvements 
led to precisely identify the events, regulate the practices of the various operators concerning the usage of the database, 
and to improve its reliability.
Since 2003, due to a regulatory obligation, the “operators’ ” annual reports are passed on to the STRMTG. These 
reports include elements of the operators (outstanding events, major modifications), the safety figures (indicators) and 
the accident record detailed analysis (analyses by type of event, and suggested measures). Thus they aim to complete 
the existing data in the database for the two other aforesaid categories. 
Among the events, some are subject to immediate information of the Prefect, the department’s safety authority, 
and the STRMTG, without waiting for the transmission of annual reports or for the resource of the database. The 
criteria concern the seriousness of the events: events causing at least one death or a severely wounded person, fires or 
important releases of smoke, accidents with important material damages, derailments, collisions; as well as the real or 
potential newsworthy aspect.
The events, according to their types, must therefore be transmitted to the STRMTG, according to various methods 
summarized below:
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                                Table 5. Table illustrating the different means of data transmission according to the type of events.
Immediately Yearly 
databases
Annual reports
Category 1 events X (potentially, according to the 
seriousness and the type of the event)
X
Category 2 events X (potentially, according to the 
media range)
X
Category 3 indicators X
2.3. Collection and data reliability
The completed, annual reports and databases, for year N must be sent to the STRMTG before June of the year N+1. 
This allows the STRMTG to have a sufficient deadline to analyze and to publish its synthesis report before the end of 
this year N+1.
The reliability of analyses and data are based on the rigor and the precision of the operatorsÿ in data collection 
accuracy.
For that purpose, the guide "Processing events relating to metro / RER safety" was developed by a working group 
directed by the STRMTG, gathering all the metro operators, involving them to elaborate a classification of the events. 
The operators were given a deeper understanding of the approach, specifically by the implementation of a tool which 
can be of use to them for a follow-up of these indicators, both on a national and internal (to their network) level.
However, the STRMTG proceeds to data verification on both of the tools (BDD and the annual report) as regards 
the events that must be immediately stated to the control services. These statements can thus be compared with the 
filling of the database "Metro / RER eventsā and of the annual report Āoperatorā. Furthermore, the STRMTG takes 
the right to bring corrections, if necessary, to the database in order to insure the data reliability.
Let us point out that given the recentness of the database, the hindsight on the evolution of safety was not very 
significant. For periods before 2012, statistics were retroactively completed on certain events, presented in annual 
reports going back up until 2003, thereby smoothing the observed trends.
3. Results of the safety indicators’ follow-up
Through these tools, these events and indicators of safety can be subject to a follow-up in time, thus, they are 
representative of the safety level of these systems. These observed trends can be more clarified in certain cases by the 
features of these systems or by the circumstances of the event, which allows having deeper analysis of accident rates. 
In fact, certain characteristics (drivers' presence, platform doors, type of facility, and length of the tunnel in 
interstation...) or certain circumstances of the event (train in simple or multiple unity), can allow to identify the 
aggravating factors of the system’s safety.
3.1. Example of results
This section presents various examples of analysis which are possible to conduct with this approach of follow-up 
indicators. The first example consists in having a national vision of the first category events that have taken place on 
metro networks between 2007 and 2013.
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Fig. 1. Excerpt from "annual report on the networks, the traffic and the events of metro operationā showing the distribution of the number of 
events taking place in the metro networks by classification.
Analysis: the individual events are mainly collision / entrapment in the doors of the train or in the platform doors, 
falls in trains, falls on the railway, falls between trains and platforms. Let us notice that the completely automated 
systems and provided with platform doors remain exempt from these first two types of cited events.
Between 2007 and 2013, the distribution of the events remains generally stable. Only the collision/entrapment into 
doors decreases in a continuous way in time. The installation of platform doors on the line 1 and 13 discouraging the 
users to “get in late or to get off late” into the train could be an explanation to this.
The second example consists of a sharper analysis of a precise event, in particular the collision/entrapment in the 
doors of the train or the platform doors. Indeed, this analysis distinguished the events that have taken place on networks 
having platform doors from those not having them.
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Fig. 2. Excerpt from "annual report on the networks, the traffic and the events of metro operation” illustrating the collision/entrapment with or 
without platform doors, by number of millions of travels.
Analysis: whereas the collision / entrapment on lines without platforms doors remain globally stable these last 
years, these events are down substantially on lines having platform doors, which are almost exclusively automatic 
lines.
These two examples illustrate the use of these indicators to follow the level of safety of all the metro networks by 
trying to explain these trends.
3.2. Use of these data
The use of these safety indicators allowed justifying the need for implementation of the database. Indeed, this 
approach was first of all seen as a constraint, for some operators already having tools to follow the safety system level. 
However, this method showed its advantages: set up means of follow-up computer system allowing the use of data to 
those who were not endowed with it and to harmonize the practices between the various operators, by sharing the 
same safety indicators.
Thus, today all the operators use or inquire the same tool as the STRMTG which they validated with the latter, and 
which helps them better monitor the safety of their systems. This tool also allows the national authority of safety to 
achieve statistics on the safety of metro networks at national level. Therefore, the operators can relate to each other 
by comparing data of their own network with national level data formalized by the STRMTG in the "annual report on 
the networks, the traffic and the events of metro operation”. Indeed, the annual report published by the STRMTG 
presents, in a fully anonymized format, the statistics in terms of accident rates of all the networks, by putting these 
statistics in perspective with those of the previous years.
The annual reports of the STRMTG are also presented and discussed within an authority, gathering all the operators 
of the working group "Rex-Metro/RER”. It is also the most adapted place to share feedback experience of the usage 
of the database and to make continuous improvement therefore.
It is possible to work on a specific accident rate issue, for example, when it is impacting on the safety of the systems 
and when the network features are not enough to explain it with simple data.
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4. Conclusion
The STRMTG’s metro networks safety control mission is being strengthened by this follow-up of indicators at 
national level, boosted by the database and the guide of the "Processing Events relating to metro networks / RER 
safety" which are in operation since 2012. These allow an overall analysis, yet a sharp one, of accident rates of these 
networks, supplemented by elements from the operators’ annual reports.
The success of this approach originates substantially from the participation, the understanding and from the 
commitment of the profession’s operators, as a whole, in the implementation of this follow-up of indicators. Indeed, 
the necessary data can only be transmitted by the operators, who were convinced to set up this follow-up. Thus, 
National level data are now analyzed and published by the STRMTG, which reports it in in a working group appointed 
"Rex-Metro / RER”.
In 2012, the implementation of these indicators was a first step for a better follow-up of the metro networks’ safety 
level, homogeneously, within the follow-up of the tramway systems. This first step required a phase of data reliability; 
nevertheless, in its continuous improvement approach and in a multiannual hindsight, the safety indicators could 
certainly be improved.
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